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Abstract. This paper presents a model to represent graphically the
impact of cyber events (e.g., attacks, countermeasures) in a polygonal
systems of n-sides. The approach considers information about all enti-
ties composing an information system (e.g., users, IP addresses, com-
munication protocols, physical and logical resources, etc.). Every axis
is composed of entities that contribute to the execution of the security
event. Each entity has an associated weighting factor that measures its
contribution using a multi-criteria methodology named CARVER. The
graphical representation of cyber events is depicted as straight lines (one
dimension) or polygons (two or more dimensions). Geometrical opera-
tions are used to compute the size (i.e, length, perimeter, surface area)
and thus the impact of each event. As a result, it is possible to identify
and compare the magnitude of cyber events. A case study with multiple
security events is presented as an illustration on how the model is built
and computed.
Keywords: Polygonal Model, Multiple Cyber Events, Impact Represen-
tation, CARVER, Response Actions
1 Introduction
A range of difficult issues confront the assessment of the impact of cyber security
events [23]. A set of individual actions performed either by the attacker (e.g.,
malicious actions executed in order to exploit a system’s vulnerability) or by
the target system (benign actions executed as a response to an adversary) is
hereinafter referred to as a cyber security event.
Computing the economic impact of cyber security events is an open research
in the ICT domain. Specialized information security organizations e.g., Com-
puter Emergency Response Team (CERT) [26], Ponemon Institute [13], Veri-
zon [24], etc., perform annual reports on such estimations based on real-world
experiences and in-depth interviews with thousands of security professionals
around the world. The research is designated to help organizations make the
most cost-effective decisions possible in minimizing the greatest risk to their
organizations.
Previous researches propose simulation models [4,5] and geometrical models
[8, 9] to estimate and analyze the impact of cyber events. Geometrical models
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have been the core topic of a variety of research in many disciplines [6, 17].
However, most of the proposed solutions are limited to three dimensions, making
it difficult to provide a graphical representation of geometrical instances in four
or more dimensions.
In this paper, we propose a geometrical model to calculate the impact of cy-
ber events in an n-sided polygonal system. The approach considers information
about all entities composing an information system (e.g., users, IP addresses,
communication protocols, physical and logical resources, etc.), as well as con-
textual information (e.g., temporal, spacial, historical conditions) to plot cyber
attacks and countermeasures as instances of n sides, in a polygonal system.
In addition, we are able to perform geometrical operations (e.g., length,
perimeter, area) over the polygonal instances, which allows us to compare the
impact of multiple cyber events. Such comparison provides the means to deter-
mine the coverage level i.e., the portion of the incident that is covered by a given
security countermeasure and the portion that is left as a residual risk.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our proposed
polygonal model and discusses about its construction. Section 3 details the main
polygonal instances that result from our model. Section 4 details the impact
measurement of the different geometrical instances. Section 5 presents a case
study with multiple events (e.g., attacks and countermeasures) to illustrate the
applicability of our approach. Related works are presented in Section 6. Finally,
conclusions and perspectives for future work are presented in Section 7.
The contributions on this paper are summarized as follows:
– A geometrical model that projects the impact of security events (e.g., attacks,
countermeasures) in an n-sided polygonal system. The instances resulting
from the model are straight lines (mono-axial system) or polygons (multi-
axial system).
– A process that performs geometrical operations to calculate the size of the
polygonal instances (i.e., length, perimeter, area), which allows us to compare
the impact of multiple cyber events.
– The deployment of our model in a case study with multiple events over
several dimensions.
2 Proposed polygonal model
A polygon is defined as an end to end connected multilateral line which can be
expressed as point sequence (P0, P1, P2,..., Pn). The P0P1, P1P2, ..., Pn−1Pn are
known as the polygon edges. And the P0, P1, P2, ..., PN are referred to as the
apex of the polygon [10].
Considering the characteristics of access control models [14–16], we identified
several entities that contribute directly to the execution of a given attack e.g.,
User account (subject), Resource (object), and Channel (the way to execute ac-
tions, e.g., connect, read, write, etc). In addition, we used the notion of contexts
proposed in the Organization based Access Control (OrBAC) model [2, 3], to
extend the approach into an n dimensional system, where every context will be
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a new dimension, such as information security properties (e.g., confidentiality,
integrity, availability); temporal conditions. (e.g., granted privileges only dur-
ing working hours), spatial conditions (e.g., granted privileges when connected
within the company premises), and historical conditions (e.g., granted privileges
only if previous instances of the same equivalent events were already conducted).
Our polygonal model is proposed to represent services, attacks and counter-
measures as an n-sided polygon, n being the number of entities (e.g, user account,
channel, resource, etc). Each entity is projected in one axis of the polygonal sys-
tem. There is no limit in the number of axes composing our model. It can be
mono-axial (considering only one entity), or multi-axial (considering two or more
entities).
Our proposed geometrical model has the following characteristics:
– There is at least one entity represented in the geometrical instance;
– The contribution of each entity is represented in one axis of the polygonal
system;
– The contribution of each axis must be greater than zero and no more than
one hundred percent;
– The end points of the instance axes are connected to form a polygon;
– The union of two end points represents one side of the polygon;
– Polygons can be regular, irregular, and/or convex;
– Concave polygons are excluded from our model since it is not possible to plot
instances in which one or more interior angles are greater than 180 degrees;
– Polygons are closed with no holes inside;
– Polygons are not self-intersecting;
The remaining of this section gives examples of the possible entities that
can be used to calculate the impact of cyber events and details the contribution
calculation of each side of our polygonal model.
2.1 Entities of the Polygonal Model
An entity is an instance that exists either physically or logically. Entities regroup
elements with similar characteristics or properties. An entity may be a physical
object such as a house or a car (they exist physically), an event, such as a house
sale or a car service, or a concept such as a customer transaction or order (they
exist logically as a concept). Examples of entities used in our polygonal model
are given as follows:
2.1.1 User Account It considers all active user accounts from the system.
A user account is the equivalent of a subject in an access control policy. User
accounts are associated to a given status in the system, from which their priv-
ileges and rights are derived (e.g., system administrator, standard user, guest,
internal user, nobody).
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2.1.2 Resource It considers physical components (e.g., host, server, printer)
and logical components (e.g., files, records, database) of limited availability
within a computer system. A resource is the equivalent of an object in an access
control policy.
2.1.3 Channel In order to have access to a particular resource, a user must
use a given channel. A channel is the equivalent to an action in an access control
policy. We consider the IP address and the port number to represent channels in
TCP/IP connections. However, each organization must define the way its users
connect to the system and have access to the organization’s resources.
Other entities can consider temporal conditions (e.g., connection time, detec-
tion time, time to react, time to completely mitigate the attack, recovery time,
etc.), spatial conditions (e.g., user’s location, security areas, specific buildings, a
country, a network or sub-network, etc.)
In addition, an event can be associated to a particular issue compromising the
system’s confidentiality (e.g., unauthorized access to sensitive information, dis-
closure resources, etc), integrity (e.g., unauthorized change of the data contents
or properties, etc), or availability (e.g., unavailable resources, denial of service,
etc).
Every organization must define their own entities based on their historical
data, expert knowledge and assessments they perform on their systems.
2.2 Dimension Contribution
Each side contributes differently in the impact calculation of the polygon. This
contribution represents the affectation of a given element in the execution of an
event. Following the CARVER methodology [21,22], which considers six criteria
(i.e., criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability),
we assign numerical values on a scale of 1 to 10 to each type of element within the
axis. As a result, we obtain a weighting factor (WF) that is associated to each
type of element. Examples of the practical implementation of this methodology
in real case scenarios can be seen in [8, 9].
The contribution Co of each side D in the execution of an event E is a value
than ranges from zero (when there is no element of the dimension affected to a
given event), to one (when all elements of the dimension are affected to a given
event). The contribution of a side D is calculated using Equation 1.
Co(D,E) =
∑n
j=1 Yj ×WF (Yj) ∀j ∈ Y∑n
i=1Xi ×WF (Xi) ∀i ∈ X
(1)
Where
X = total number of elements
Y = affected elements
WF = Weighting Factor
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In order to apply Equation 1 in a practical case, let us consider the axis de-
fined in the previous section. The contribution for the user account dimension,
for instance, can be evaluated as the number of users affected by a given attack
over the total number of active users from the system. Similarly, the contribu-
tion of the confidentiality dimension can be evaluated as the number of alerts
indicating a confidentiality issue over the total number of alerts in a given period
of time. For spacial contexts we can evaluate the number of incidents occurring
in a given location over the total number of reported incidents within a period
of time.
3 Resulting Polygonal Instances
A variety of geometrical instances (e.g., regular and irregular polygons such as:
line segments, triangles, squares, pentagons, etc.) results from the analysis of
the entities’ information included in a system, attack and/or countermeasure.
By definition, polygons are not allowed to have holes in them [23]. The remaining
of this section details the different polygonal instances.
3.1 One Dimension
Plotting the contribution of one dimension into our polygonal system results
into a line segment. Let us consider, for instance, an attack A1 that compromises
standard users U1 : U5 (WF = 2) and admin U11 : U20 (WF = 5), from a list
of 30 users (users U1 : U10 with WF = 2 and users U11 : U30 with WF = 5).
The contribution of this dimension will be equal to Co(Dim1) = (5×2)+(10×5)(10×2)+(20×5)
= 0.5. Figure 1(a) shows the graphical representation of the impact contribution
of attack A1 over the user dimension (Dim1).
(a) Straight Line (b) Right Isosceles Triangle
Fig. 1. Impact graphical representation in one and two dimensions
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3.2 Two Dimensions
When we have information of two dimensions of our polygonal system (e.g.,
resources and channels, or users and location), we plot the information to ob-
tain polygons in two dimensions (i.e., right triangles). For instance, an attack
that compromises 70% of resources (Dim1), using 70% of the system’s channels
(Dim2), will be represented as a right isosceles triangle
1 (Figure 1(b)); the same
attack that compromises 40% of resources (Dim1), using 70% of the system’s
channels (Dim2) will be represented as a right scalene triangle
2.
3.3 Three Dimensions
The representation of the impact contribution in three dimensions results into
any type of triangles except for right triangles. For instance, an attack with 70%
of resources, users and channels contribution will be represented as an equilat-
eral triangle3; the same attack with 40% of resource contribution, 70% of user
contribution, and 60% of channel contribution will be graphically represented as
a scalene triangle4 (Figure 2(a)).
(a) Scalene Triangle (b) Rhomboid
Fig. 2. Impact graphical representation in three and four dimensions
1 Triangle with a right angle and two equal sides and angles
2 Triangle with a right angle and all sides of different lengths
3 Triangle in which all three sides are equal and all three internal angles are congruent
to each other
4 Triangle with all sides and angles unequal
Polygonal Model 7
3.4 Four Dimensions
Four-dimensional geometry is Euclidean geometry extended into one additional
dimension. The graphical representation of the impact contribution of a given
event in four dimensions results into a quadrilateral5 . We discard rectangles,
since it is not possible to represent instances that have both: two equal alternate
sides and right angles. In addition, we discard rhombus from our graphical rep-
resentation, since it is not possible to represent instances that have both: equal
lengths and non-right angles.
Let us consider, for instance, an attack with 40% of contribution in four
dimensions: resources (Dim1) users (Dim2), channels (Dim3), and recovery time
(Dim4) will be represented as a square. The same attack compromising 40%
of resources (Dim1) and channels (Dim3), 10% of users (Dim2), and 70% of
the recovery time (Dim4) will be graphically represented as a kite
6. Similarly,
the same attack compromising 40% of resources (Dim1) and channels (Dim3),
and 90% of users (Dim2) and recovery time (Dim4) will be represented as a
rombhoid7, as shown in Figure 2(b).
3.5 N Dimensions
Following the same approach as in previous examples, we propose to represent
the impact of each dimension composing our polygonal system as segments,
and to connect them to form a 2D (regular or irregular) closed polygon (e.g.
pentagon, hexagon, octagon, etc.)
For instance, let us assume that we have information of attack A1 affect-
ing five dimensions: Co(Dim1) = 50%, Co(Dim2) = 80%, Co(Dim3) = 60%,
Co(Dim4) = 65%, and Co(Dim5) = 90%. The contribution impact of attack A1
is graphically represented as an irregular pentagon, as depicted in Figure 3(a).
The model selects all elements affected in each dimension to represent it
as a continuous segment that indicates the impact of such dimension for that
particular event. We connect them all in order to form an n-polygon (n being
the number of dimensions of the polygonal system).
In addition, Figure 3(b) depicts the graphical representation of an irregular
octagon, where the contribution of the odd dimensions is 30%, and the con-
tribution of the even dimensions is 100%. A variant of this case will be if the
contribution to an event on one or more dimensions is zero. In such a case, the
dimension will be discarded from the graphical representation.
5 Polygon with four sides and vertices (e.g., square, rhombus, kite, etc)
6 Quadrilateral whose four sides can be grouped into two pairs of equal-length sides
that are adjacent to each other
7 Parallelogram in which adjacent sides are of unequal lengths and angles are non-right
angled
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(a) Irregular Pentagon (b) Irregular Octagon
Fig. 3. Impact graphical representation in more than four dimensions
4 Geometrical Operations
This section details the measurements of the different geometrical figures de-
scribed in the previous section. Such measurement allows the mathematical com-
putation of the impact of multiple events in the system.
4.1 Length of Polygons
The length of a straight line corresponds to the distance from its origin to its
endpoint. In a mono-axial polygonal system, the length is computed as the im-
pact contribution of such dimension over the event. Results are expressed in
units, using Equation 1. In a bi-axial or multi-axial polygonal system, the length
is the equivalent of the perimeter of a polygon.
The perimeter of a regular polygon equals the sum of the lengths of its edges.
A regular polygon may be defined by the number of its sides n and by its radius
R, that is to say, the constant distance between its center and each of its vertex.
The perimeter of a regular polygon is computed using Equation 2.
P (RegularPolygon) = 2× n×R× sin(180
n
) (2)
Particular cases can be defined. In a bi-axial polygonal system, for instance,
the perimeter (P ) of an event is calculated as the sum of the impact contri-
bution of each dimension to the event and the length of the connecting side of
the two axes, as shown in Equation 1. For equilateral polygons (e.g., hexagon,
heptagon,...) whose edge’s length is known, we calculate the perimeter using
Equation 2, whereas for irregular polygons, we use Equation 3 to calculate their
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perimeter.
P (RightTriangle) = Co(Dim1) + Co(Dim2) + L(X) (3)
P (EquilateralPolygon) = n× L(X) (4)
P (IrregularPolygon) =
∑n
i=1 Li(X) (5)
Where
L, L1, L2,..., Ln = length of the edges of the polygon
n = Number of sides of a regular polygon
Let us consider, for instance, a regular polygon of five sides (i.e., pentagon),
with each dimension contribution equals to 10%. The perimeter of the pentagon
is calculated as P (RegularPentagon) = 2× 5× 10× sin(45)= 58.78 units. For
irregular polygons, the perimeter is calculated as the sum of the length of each
edge (Equation 3), considering the same pentagon, whose edges measure (10, 25,
10, 45, 20), the perimeter of such polygon is equal to P (IregularPentagon) =
110 units.
4.2 Area of Polygons
The area (A) of a given event measures the amount of space inside the boundary
of a flat (2-dimensional) object such as a triangle or square.
For regular polygons, the area equals the product of the perimeter and the
apothem8 divided by two. Results are expressed in units2, using Equation 6.
A(RegularPolygon) =
Perimeter ×Apothem
2
(6)
For irregular polygons, we compute the area as the sum of the contribution
value of Dimi times the contribution value of Dimi+1 divided by two, as shown
in Equation 7.
A(IrregularPolygon) =
∑n
i=1 Co(Dimi)× Co(Dimi+1)
2
(7)
For the previous Equation, note that in the last term (i.e., Co(Dimn)), the ex-
pression must wrap around back to the first term (i.e., Co(Dim1)). This method
works correctly for triangles, regular and irregular polygons, as well as convex
and concave polygons, but it will produce wrong answers for self-intersecting
polygons, where one side crosses over another. However, such cases are excluded
from our research.
Let us take an example of an attack A1 that affects 60% of resources (Dim1),
60% of channels (Dim2), 80% of users (Dim3) and requires 40% of recovery time
(Dim4). Attack A1 will have an area equal to A(Quadrilateral) = [(60× 60) +
(60× 80) + (80× 40) + (40× 60)]/2 = 700 units2
8 The line segment from the center of a regular polygon to the midpoint of a side
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5 Case Study:
A vulnerability in OpenSSH (i.e., CVE-2015-5600) has been exploited to by-
pass the maximum number of authentication attempts and launch attack A1
(brute force attack against a targeted server). The vulnerability is related to the
keyboard-interactive authentication mechanism and it can be exploited through
the KbdInteractiveDevices option. The crucial part is that if the attacker re-
quests 10,000 keyboard-interactive devices, OpenSSH will gracefully execute the
request and will be inside a loop to accept passwords until the specified de-
vices are exceeded. A remote attacker could therefore try up to 10,000 different
passwords and they would only be limited by a login grace time setting, which
by default is set to two minutes. Attack A1 affects a great number of users,
channels, resources, and systems where keyboard-interactive authentication is
enabled. Three security countermeasures have been proposed to mitigate attack
A1. Table 1 summarizes this information.
Proposed Countermasures:
C.1 Install an OpenSSH patch
C.2 Limit access to SSH in the firewall,
C.3 Disable password authentication for the root account
Table 1. Events Dimensional Information
Dimension Category Q WF A1 C1 C2 C3
Internal root 3 5 3 3 3 3
user standard user 25 2 25 25 25 -
Channels credentials 28 4 28 - - 3
IP addresses 30 3 - - 30 -
Physical PC 27 2 - 27 - -
resources server 12 5 5 3 - 12
Logical firewall 2 4 2 - 2 -
resources software 10 3 4 4 - 5
The first two columns from Table 1 identify the four main dimensions and
categories of each dimensions respectively. The next two columns shows the
number of elements (Q) composing each category of the dimension, and their
corresponding weighting factor (WF). The rest of the columns show the number
of elements affected by attack A1 and countermeasures C1, C2, and C3.
5.1 Impact Calculation
1. System Dimensions: We compute the system’s dimensions using information
from Table 1, as follows:
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– Internal User (IU) = (3× 5) + (25× 2) = 65 units
– Channels (Ch) = (28× 4) + (30× 3) = 202 units
– Physical Resources (PR) = (27× 2) + (12× 5) = 114 units
– Logical Resources (LR) = (2× 4) + (10× 3) = 38 units
2. Dimension Contribution: We calculate the contribution of each dimension
on the execution of the events (i.e.,A1, C1, C2, and C3) with respect to the
system value, using Equation 1. For instance, Attack A1 affects the following
dimensions:
– IU = (3× 5) + (25× 2) = 65 units → 100%
– Ch = 28× 4 = 112 units → 55.45%
– PR = 5× 5 = 25 units → 21.93%
– LR = (2× 4) + (4× 3) = 20 units → 52.63%
3. Impact Calculation: We calculate the geometrical operations of attack A1
and countermeasures C1, C2, and C3, using Equations 5 and 7. For attack A1,
for instance, we compute the perimeter and area as follows:
P(A1) = L(IU −Ch) + L(Ch−PR) + L(PR−LR) + L(LR− IU) P(A1) = 114.34
+ 59.62 + 57.02 + 113.00 = 343.99 units
A(A1) =
(100×55.45)+(55.45×21.93)+(21.93×52.63)+(52.63×100)
2
A(A1) = 6, 588.91 units
2
Table 2 summarizes the impact values of all events.
Table 2. Event Impact Evaluation
Event P(units) A(units2)
S 565.69 20,000.00
A1 343.99 6,588.91
C1 333.66 2,534.63
C2 277.28 3,280.35
C3 188.31 1,719.12
C1 ∪ C2 357.77 6,110.71
C1 ∪ C3 340.76 3,645.09
C2 ∪ C3 351.73 6,412.67
C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 364.40 6,744.36
As depicted in Table 2, attack A1 is compared against the system S and
countermeasures C1, C2, and C3. Attack A1 affects 32.94% of the total sys-
tem area. Applying countermeasures individually will reduce part of the attack
impact. However, if multiple countermeasures are implemented, the risk is ex-
pected to be reduced substantially. The best solution for this attack scenario is
implementing C2 and C3, since the application of the three countermeasures will
probably increase costs and potential collateral damages with no improvement
in the mitigation level of attack A1.
12 Gustavo Gonzalez-Granadillo, Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro, and Herve´ Debar
5.2 Graphical Representation
Figure 4 shows the graphical representation of attack A1 (in blue) and the indi-
vidual implementation of countermeasures C1 (in red), C2 (in green), and C3 (in
grey). The graphical representation shows a case by case implementation of the
different security countermeasures. It is important to note that each countermea-
sure affects a given set of elements in at least one dimension. Countermeasure
C2, for instance, only affects elements that are vulnerable to attack A1, whereas
Countermeasures C1, and C3 requires modifications of elements that are not
vulnerable to attack A1 (e.g., physical resources).
Fig. 4. Impact graphical representation of events - Case by Case Analysis
The visualization of cyber attacks and countermeasures in the same geomet-
rical space helps security administrators in the analysis, evaluation and selection
of security actions as a response to cyber attacks. It is possible to identify priority
areas (e.g., those where most attacks are concentrated, or where more elements
of the system are vulnerable), and perform reaction strategies accordingly. It is
also possible to visualize the portion of the attack (e.g., the area of the polygon)
that is being controlled by a security countermeasure, and the portion that is
left with no treatment (e.g., residual risk).
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Furthermore, it is also possible to plot multiple cyber attacks occurring simul-
taneously in the system. The same can be performed for multiple countermea-
sures that need to be implemented simultaneously. The graphical representation
of the resulting instance will generally cover a grater area than their individual
representations. For instance, the graphical representation of the three counter-
measures implemented simultaneously is depicted in Figure 5, where attack A1
is represented by the blue polygon, and the set of countermeasures is represented
by the yellow polygon.
For this example, the implementation of multiple countermeasures increases
the coverage area of the attack, which in turn reduces the attack impact, making
it look more attractive than their individual implementation.
Fig. 5. Impact graphical representation of events - Combined Analysis
6 Related Work
Determining the impact of cyber security events is an open research in the ICT
domain. Several research works rely on metrics to quantitatively measure such
impacts. Howard et al., [11,12] and Manadhata et. al. [18–20], for instance, pro-
pose a model to systematically measure the attack surface of different software.
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However, the approach presents the following shortcomings: it cannot be applied
in the absence of source code; it includes only technical impact; it cannot be used
to compare different system environments; and it does not evaluate the impact
of multiple attacks occurring simultaneously in the system.
Other researchers rely on simulations to analyze and estimate the impact of
cyber events. Dini et. al [4, 5], for instance, present a simulative approach to
attack impact analysis that allows for evaluating the effects of attacks, ranking
them according to their severity, and provides valuable insights on the attack
impact since during the design phase. The research differs from our work, since
their simulation does not provide quantitative analysis on the impact of coun-
termeasures while evaluating the impact of attacks.
Other approaches use geometrical models to provide a 3D view of the events
in a variety of disciplines. Emerson et al. [6], for instance, propose a geometrical
3D model for use within sport injury studies in order to influence the design of
sport equipment and surfaces, which could help to prevent sports injuries. In
addition, Liebel and Smitch [17], present a geometrical approach for multi-view
object class detection that allows performing approximate 3D pose estimation
for generic object classes. However, geometrical models are limited to a 3D pro-
jection.
2D models have been proposed in a variety of domains [1, 7, 25, 27] as syn-
thetic and generic visualization models that overcome previous drawbacks from
3D representations. 2D models enable viewers to visualize the overall big picture
and the interrelationships of various entities. Users may be able to observe how
the changes on selected events could potentially affect the overall system to pro-
vide understanding on interrelated impacts. However, since the model provides
an abstract picture of one or multiple events, its visualization does not provide
an accurate value of the impact coverage (e.g., it is not possible to identify the
exact mitigation level of a given countermeasures). It is therefore important to
combine the visualization approach with geometrical operations that quantita-
tively indicate the level at which an attack is controlled by a mitigation action.
7 Conclusions
Based on the limitations of the current solutions, we propose a geometrical ap-
proach to project the impact of cyber events in an n-dimensional polygonal
system. The approach uses geometrical operations to compute the size of the
polygon, and thus the impact of the represented event. As a result, we are able
to project multiple events (e.g., attacks, countermeasures), in a variety of axes
(e.g., users, channels, resources, CIA, time, etc.), which provides the means to
propose security countermeasures as a reaction strategy to mitigate the detected
attacks.
The main novelty of the approach is the use of multiple criteria to build the
n-sided polygon using the dimension contribution Equation discussed in Section
2.2 and the use of metrics (i.e., length and area), as discussed in Section 4.
As such, we overcome previous drawbacks about visualization (e.g., inability to
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plot the impact of cyber security events in four or more dimensions). Results
show that implementing multiple countermeasures simultaneously increases the
protection area and thus reduces the impact of a given attack.
Future work will concentrate in quantifying the residual risk and potential
collateral damage that result out of the implementation of a set of counter-
measures. In addition, we will include other event’s related information (e.g.,
attackers knowledge, capabilities, etc) in order to explore external dimensions
that could influence in the impact calculation of a cyber security event.
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